Welcome to the Utopia Forums! Register a new account
The current time is Tue Apr 07 23:42:31 2020

Utopia Talk / Politics / SCOTUS-Polarized?
Habebe
Member
Sat Mar 07 13:18:00
Now I havnt looked all the recent rulings.So I'm just going by what comes up in my news feeds but they all seem like 5-4 decisions.

I've also read what seems to be several grumblingss by Sotomayer that it is a bias court.



Rugian
Member
Sat Mar 07 13:33:41
Sotomayer'a argument was ridiculous. I'm sure shes correct in saying that SCOTUS has granted Trump a record number of reliefs from lower court injunctions...but that's only because the administration has faced a record number of injunctions in the first place.

For most of history, national injunctions issued by the courts havw been rare, but in the past few years increasingly politicized judges have abused the power with alarming frequency. In the eight years of Obama's presidency, 20 national injunctions were issued. As of September 2019, Trump had already been slapped with 40.

We reaally should be talking about whether or not district judges should have the power to issue national injunctions in the first place. There are over 660 district court judgeships in the USA, and the idea that every single one of them should be able to effectively overturn any law they disagree with is beyond ridiculous. That's why the Supreme Court has had to intervene so frequently in these matters.
Rugian
Member
Sat Mar 07 13:35:49
and the idea that every single one of them should *singlehandedly* be able to effectively overturn any law they disagree

Fixed
hood
Member
Sat Mar 07 15:11:49
"For most of history, national injunctions issued by the courts havw been rare"

For most of history, the office of the president hasn't stepped so far over the line that the courts needed to order injunctions. The correlation you're looking for is criminal activity vs. injunctions, not politicization of judges vs. injunctions.
Rugian
Member
Sat Mar 07 17:03:02
Hood -

Well, that's a completely indefensible position.

I take it that you're arguing that questionable laws or executive orders didn't exist before the 1960s. I also take it that you think that nationwide suspensions of laws are warranted in ruling on individual cases. And furthermore, I take it that you're arguing that the process for seeking injunctions isn't an inherently political process, that involves everything from judge shopping to inventing novel and hitherto non-existent restrictions on executive and legislative power.

This is not an argument that you're going to win.
hood
Member
Sat Mar 07 19:43:52
When one froths at the mouth this much, it's usually a sign of health problems. In this case, I can't imagine any problem that won't be solved by a nice, substantial lobotomy, rugian. You'll feel so much better afterwards, and it'll probably prevent the feral stupidity that tends to ooze out of you.


tldr:
no, you're stupid, and Trump is very clearly, objectively, beyond the pale.
sam adams
Member
Sat Mar 07 19:56:18
Its both.

Trump is more retarded than other presidents AND these days more courts have a deranged liberal bias that the high court needs to quash.

I have spoken.
Forwyn
Member
Sat Mar 07 20:57:20
lol @ Sotomayor whining that states would be allowed to enforce state criminal law

We dodged a bullet that would have gone down as a federal expansion of power on par with Wickard v Filburn.
Habebe
Member
Sun Mar 08 01:06:58
Forwyn, That was the case that sparked this.

I mean from a lay man, I fimd ot odd that illegal immigrants should only be able to deal with federal courts because of there illegal status being a federal issue. It really just doesnt make sense, if you or I used fake documents/ ID thebstate would lock us up.
Habebe
Member
Sun Mar 08 01:10:32
Also, With rare exception I think everyone has a good deal of respect for Roberts.Class act all the way.

That said while agree with his recent rebuttal of Schumer, i also side withindsey Graham in saying no sensure required. I seen the speech, I honestly think it was a rally speech that got out of hand, he appologized, watsr under the bridge.
hood
Member
Sun Mar 08 08:09:49
"i also side with [Lindsey] Graham"

This is how you should be able to tell you're wrong. Doesn't matter what it is, really. If Lindsey Graham is saying it, it's wrong.
Rugian
Member
Sun Mar 08 08:18:27
Federal courts have literally ruled that Trunp cant issue EOs that reverse Obama's EOs. Yet Hood thinks that the fault is entirely with 100% with Trump and not politicize judges. ROFL
Rugian
Member
Sun Mar 08 09:00:10
Here's Justice Thomas' argument against nationwide injunctions, noting that they are a recent invention and are inconsistent with traditional limits on judicial power:

"I write separately to address the remedy that the plaintiffs sought and obtained in this case. The District Court imposed an injunction that barred the Government from enforcing the President’s Proclamation against anyone, not just the plaintiffs. Injunctions that prohibit the Executive Branch from applying a law or policy against anyone—often called “universal” or “nationwide” injunctions—have become increasingly common.1 District courts, including the one here, have begun imposing universal injunctions without considering their authority to grant such sweeping relief. These injunctions are beginning to take a toll on the federal court system—preventing legal questions from percolating through the federal courts, encouraging forum shopping, and making every case a national emergency for the courts and for the Executive Branch.

 I am skeptical that district courts have the authority to enter universal injunctions. These injunctions did not emerge until a century and a half after the founding. And they appear to be inconsistent with longstanding limits on equitable relief and the power of Article III courts. If their popularity continues, this Court must address their legality.

I

 If district courts have any authority to issue universal injunctions, that authority must come from a statute or the Constitution. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U. S. 70

124 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). No statute expressly grants district courts the power to issue universal injunctions.2 So the only possible bases for these injunctions are a generic statute that authorizes equitable relief or the courts’ inherent constitutional authority. Neither of those sources would permit a form of injunctive relief that is “[in]consistent with our history and traditions.” Ibid.

A

 This Court has never treated general statutory grants of equitable authority as giving federal courts a freewheeling power to fashion new forms of equitable remedies. Rather, it has read such statutes as constrained by “the body of law which had been transplanted to this country from the English Court of Chancery” in 1789. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 105 (1945). As Justice Story explained, this Court’s “settled doctrine” under such statutes is that “the remedies in equity are to be administered . . . according to the practice of courts of equity in [England].” Boyle v. Zacharie & Turner, 6 Pet. 648, 658 (1832). More recently, this Court reiterated that broad statutory grants of equitable authority give federal courts “ ‘an authority to administer in equity suits the principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries.’ ” Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U. S. 308, 318 (1999) (Scalia, J.) (quoting Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U. S. 563, 568 (1939)).


B

 The same is true of the courts’ inherent constitutional authority to grant equitable relief, assuming any such authority exists. See Jenkins, 515 U. S., at 124 (Thomas, J., concurring). This authority is also limited by the traditional rules of equity that existed at the founding.

 The scope of the federal courts’ equitable authority under the Constitution was a point of contention at the founding, and the “more limited construction” of that power prevailed. Id., at 126. The founding generation viewed equity “with suspicion.” Id., at 128. Several anti-Federalists criticized the Constitution’s extension of the federal judicial power to “Case[s] in . . . Equity,” Art. III, §2, as “giv[ing] the judge a discretionary power.” Letters from The Federal Farmer No. XV (Jan. 18, 1788), in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 315, 322 (H. Storing ed. 1981). That discretionary power, the anti-Federalists alleged, would allow courts to “explain the constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to the words or letter.” Essays of Brutus No. XI (Jan. 31, 1788), in id., at 417, 419–420. The Federalists responded to this concern by emphasizing the limited nature of equity. Hamilton explained that the judiciary would be “bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.” The Federalist No. 78, p. 471 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (Federalist). Although the purpose of a court of equity was “to give relief in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to general rules,” “the principles by which that relief is governed are now reduced to a regular system.” Id. No. 83 at 505 (emphasis deleted).

 The Federalists’ explanation was consistent with how equity worked in 18th-century England. English courts of equity applied established rules not only when they decided the merits, but also when they fashioned remedies. Like other aspects of equity, “the system of relief adminis tered by a court of equity” had been reduced “into a regular science.” 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 440–441 (1768) (Blackstone). As early as 1768, Blackstone could state that the “remedy a suitor is entitled to expect” could be determined “as readily and with as much precision, in a court of equity as in a court of law.” Id., at 441. Although courts of equity exercised remedial “discretion,” that discretion allowed them to deny or tailor a remedy despite a demonstrated violation of a right, not to expand a remedy beyond its traditional scope. See G. Keeton, An Introduction to Equity 117–118 (1938).

 In short, whether the authority comes from a statute or the Constitution, district courts’ authority to provide equitable relief is meaningfully constrained. This author- ity must comply with longstanding principles of equity that predate this country’s founding.

II

 Universal injunctions do not seem to comply with those principles. These injunctions are a recent development, emerging for the first time in the 1960s and dramatically increasing in popularity only very recently. And they appear to conflict with several traditional rules of equity, as well as the original understanding of the judicial role.

 Equity originated in England as a means for the Crown to dispense justice by exercising its sovereign authority. See Adams, The Origins of English Equity, 16 Colum. L. Rev. 87, 91 (1916). Petitions for equitable relief were referred to the Chancellor, who oversaw cases in equity. See 1 S. Symon’s, Pomeroy’s, Equity Jurisprudence §33 (5th ed. 1941) (Pomeroy); G. McDowell, Equity and the Constitution 24 (1982). The Chancellor’s equitable jurisdiction was based on the “reserve of justice in the king.” F. Maitland, Equity 3 (2d ed. 1936); see also 1 Pomeroy §33, at 38 (describing the Chancellor’s equitable authority as an “extraordinary jurisdiction—that of Grace—by delega tion” from the King). Equity allowed the sovereign to afford discretionary relief to parties where relief would not have been available under the “rigors of the common law.” Jenkins, supra, at 127 (opinion of Thomas, J.).

 The English system of equity did not contemplate universal injunctions. As an agent of the King, the Chancellor had no authority to enjoin him. See Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 425 (2017) (Bray). The Chancellor could not give “any relief against the king, or direct any act to be done by him, or make any decree disposing of or affecting his property; not even in cases where he is a royal trustee.” 3 Blackstone 428. The Attorney General could be sued in Chancery, but not in cases that “ ‘immediately concerned’ ” the interests of the Crown. Bray 425 (citing 1 E. Daniell, The Practice of the High Court of Chancery 138 (2d ed. 1845)). American courts inherited this tradition. See J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Pleadings §69 (1838) (Story).

 Moreover, as a general rule, American courts of equity did not provide relief beyond the parties to the case. If their injunctions advantaged nonparties, that benefit was merely incidental. Injunctions barring public nuisances were an example. While these injunctions benefited third parties, that benefit was merely a consequence of providing relief to the plaintiff. Woolhandler & Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine? 102 Mich. L. Rev. 689, 702 (2004) (Woolhandler & Nelson); see Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 564 (1852) (explaining that a private “injury makes [a public nuisance] a private nuisance to the injured party”).

 True, one of the recognized bases for an exercise of equitable power was the avoidance of “multiplicity of suits.” Bray 426; accord, 1 Pomeroy §243. Courts would employ “bills of peace” to consider and resolve a number of suits in a single proceeding. Id., §246. And some authori ties stated that these suits could be filed by one plaintiff on behalf of a number of others. Id., §251. But the “general rule” was that “all persons materially interested . . . in the subject-matter of a suit, are to be made parties to it . . . , however numerous they may be, so that there may be a complete decree, which shall bind them all.” Story §72, at 61 (emphasis added). And, in all events, these “proto-class action[s]” were limited to a small group of similarly situated plaintiffs having some right in common. Bray 426–427; see also Story §120, at 100 (explaining that such suits were “always” based on “a common interest or a common right”).

 American courts’ tradition of providing equitable relief only to parties was consistent with their view of the nature of judicial power. For most of our history, courts understood judicial power as “fundamentall[y] the power to render judgments in individual cases.” Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 584 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2–3). They did not believe that courts could make federal policy, and they did not view judicial review in terms of “striking down” laws or regulations. See id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–4). Misuses of judicial power, Hamilton reassured the people of New York, could not threaten “the general liberty of the people” because courts, at most, adjudicate the rights of “individual[s].” Federalist No. 78, at 466.

 The judiciary’s limited role was also reflected in this Court’s decisions about who could sue to vindicate certain rights. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2–4). A plaintiff could not bring a suit vindicating public rights—i.e., rights held by the community at large—without a showing of some specific injury to himself. Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 3–4). And a plaintiff could not sue to vindicate the private rights of someone else. See Woolhandler & Nelson 715–716. Such claims were considered to be beyond the authority of courts. Id., at 711–717.

 This Court has long respected these traditional limits on equity and judicial power. See, e.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 107, 115 (1897) (rejecting an injunction based on the theory that the plaintiff “so represents [a] class” whose rights were infringed by a statute as “too conjectural to furnish a safe basis upon which a court of equity ought to grant an injunction”). Take, for example, this Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923). There, a taxpayer sought to enjoin the enforcement of an appropriation statute. The Court noted that this kind of dispute “is essentially a matter of public and not of individual concern.” Id., at 487. A general interest in enjoining implementation of an illegal law, this Court explained, provides “no basis . . . for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity.” Ibid. Courts can review the constitutionality of an act only when “a justiciable issue” requires it to decide whether to “disregard an unconstitutional enactment.” Id., at 488. If the statute is unconstitutional, then courts enjoin “not the execution of the statute, but the acts of the official.” Ibid. Courts cannot issue an injunction based on a mere allegation “that officials of the executive department of the government are executing and will execute an act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional.” Ibid. “To do so would be not to decide a judicial controversy.” Id., at 488–489.

 By the latter half of the 20th century, however, some jurists began to conceive of the judicial role in terms of resolving general questions of legality, instead of addressing those questions only insofar as they are necessary to resolve individual cases and controversies. See Bray 451. That is when what appears to be “the first [universal] injunction in the United States” emerged. Bray 438. In Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F. 2d 518 (CADC 1963), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed a lawsuit challenging the Secretary of Labor’s determination of the prevailing minimum wage for a particular industry. Id., at 520. The D. C. Circuit concluded that the Secretary’s determination was unsupported, but remanded for the District Court to assess whether any of the plaintiffs had standing to challenge it. Id., at 521–535. The D. C. Circuit also addressed the question of remedy, explaining that if a plaintiff had standing to sue then “the District Court should enjoin . . . the Secretary’s determination with respect to the entire industry.” Id., at 535 (emphasis added). To justify this broad relief, the D. C. Circuit explained that executive officers should honor judicial decisions “in all cases of essentially the same character.” Id., at 534. And it noted that, once a court has decided an issue, it “would ordinarily give the same relief to any individual who comes to it with an essentially similar cause of action.” Ibid. The D. C. Circuit added that the case was “clearly a proceeding in which those who have standing are here to vindicate the public interest in having congressional enactments prop- erly interpreted and applied.” Id., at 534–535.

 Universal injunctions remained rare in the decades following Wirtz. See Bray 440–445. But recently, they have exploded in popularity. See id., at 457–459. Some scholars have criticized the trend. See generally id., at 457–465; Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B. U. L. Rev. 615, 633–653 (2017); Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 487, 521–538 (2016).

 No persuasive defense has yet been offered for the practice. Defenders of these injunctions contend that they ensure that individuals who did not challenge a law are treated the same as plaintiffs who did, and that universal injunctions give the judiciary a powerful tool to check the Executive Branch. See Amdur & Hausman, Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 49, 51, 54 (2017); Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 56, 57, 60–62 (2017). But these arguments do not explain how these injunctions are consistent with the historical limits on equity and judicial power. They at best “boi[l] down to a policy judgment” about how powers ought to be allocated among our three branches of government. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 23). But the people already made that choice when they ratified the Constitution.

*  *  *

 In sum, universal injunctions are legally and historically dubious. If federal courts continue to issue them, this Court is dutybound to adjudicate their authority to do so."

http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/17-965
hood
Member
Sun Mar 08 12:11:54
Rugian thinks 1 case presented with absolutely no context is representative of the breadth of actions taken by district courts. I refer back to the lobotomy I recommended earlier.
Rugian
Member
Sun Mar 08 12:20:35
Remember when Hood at least bothered to try and make persuasive arguments? Yeah, me neither.
hood
Member
Sun Mar 08 12:27:11
Remember when Rugian was worth arguing with? Yeah, me neither.
Rugian
Member
Sun Mar 08 13:03:58
I highly doubt you have the functional ability to make arguments in the first place, given that you haven't provided anything other than "Orange Man bad, so any judicial acts opposing him are automatically good."

I guess we shouldn't expect anything better from a HOer.
Habebe
Member
Sun Mar 08 14:47:39
Hood, "This is how you should be able to tell you're wrong. Doesn't matter what it is, really. If Lindsey Graham is saying it, it's wrong."

So your arguing that Chuck Schumer should be legally censured for his comments abput the SC?
hood
Member
Sun Mar 08 15:17:24
Rugian:

Your inability to remember when I did bother to engage you in arguments is either exceptional evidence for why I don't bother to talk to you (there's no point in arguing with someone who bases their arguments on fantasy), or a sign that you need to stop drinking yourself retarded. Either way, you are not worth arguing with and haven't been for about 4-5 years.


Habebe:
Yes, he's wrong. We can look at the full quote:
"I don't want to start censuring everybody," the South Carolina Republican said, later adding, "If we start censuring him, they're going to want to censure Trump, and this stuff never ends."

Yeah, Graham is a fucking moron and should never be listened to. It's actually a bit comical that one can make such an argument completely in the dark and still be correct.
show deleted posts

Your Name:
Your Password:
Your Message:
Bookmark and Share